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THE ROLE OF GOVER1'\JMENT IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CARY COGLIANESE* 
ELI7�WETH K KEATING** 
MICHAEL L. MICHAEL*** 
THOMAS ] . HEALEY**** 
Recent corporate scandals have led to public pressure to 
reform business practices and increase regulation. Of course, 
dishonesty, greed, and cover-ups are not new societal con­
cerns. Indeed, much of the existing system of corporate regu­
lation in the United States emerged in response to vagaries of 
the late 1920s and the subsequent stock market crash. What 
has changed in recent years, though, is the frequency and pub­
lic salience of corporate scandals. As a measure of public at­
tention, media coverage of corporate governance issues has in­
creased sharply since the fall of 2001, when Enron declared 
dramatic third quarter losses. Over the past three years, sto­
ries on corporate governance increased by more than five 
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times in the Wall Street journal and more than ten times in USA 
Today, relative to the previous three years. 1 
The public outcry over the recent scandals has made it 
clear that the status quo is no longer acceptable: the public is 
demanding accountability and responsibility in corporate be­
havior. It is widely believed that it wiil take more than just 
leadership by the corporate sector to restore public confi­
dence in our capital markets and ensure their ongoing vitality. 
It will also take effective government action, in the form of 
reformed regulatory systems, improved auditing, and stepped 
up law enforcement. 
Already policymakers have adopted numerous reforms. 
In 2002, Congress speedily passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,'2 im­
posing (among other things) new financial control and report­
ing requirements on publicly traded companies. The Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the self-regula­
tory organizations it oversees-both the New York Stock 
Exchange ("NYSE") and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers ("NASD")-have adopted new standards for public 
companies and securities dealers." The newly created Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") is working 
to revamp oversight of auditors.4 Finally, state and federal en-
l .  We compared the results of Westlaw searches for the three years 
p rior to Enron 's loss disclosure on October 16, 200 1 ,  with results for the 
three subsequen t years. In the Wall Street Journal database, coverage in­
creased from 3 1 4  stories containing the words "corporate governance" in the 
1998-2001 period to 1,852 stories in the 2001-2004 period. In USA Today, 
hardly a newspaper noted for its financial coverage, the n u mber of stories 
mentioning "corporate governance" increased from 22 to 256. Not surpris­
ingly, the number of stories with the terms "cot·porate fraud" also in­
creased-from 7 to 1 51 stories in the Wall Street journal, and zero to 71 sto­
ries in USA Today. 
2. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 ( codi­
fied in scattered sections of 15 U.S. C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act]. 
3. See NASD Manual Rule 4350 (2003) , available at http:/ / cchwallstreet. 
com/ nasd/ nasdviewer.asp;SelectedN ode=4&Fi leName=/ n asd/ nascl_rules/ 
RulesoftheA<>sociation_mg.xml#chp_1_4; NYSE Listed Company Manual 
§ 303A (2003), available at http:/ /www .nyse .com/listecl/pl0 20656067970. 
h tml?displayPage=%2Fabout%2Fl  0455 1 6490394. hun) 
4. See William J McDonough, Chairman Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, Speech at the Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer,  Jr .  Lecture on 
Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, 9 FoRDK'\l'vi J. CoRP. & FIN. L., 583, 
595-97 ( 2004); see also PCAOB, BRIEFING PAPER: PROPOSED AuDITING STAN­
DARD oN CoNFORMING 1\o'V!ENDMENTS TO PCAOB INTERIM STANDARDS REsuLT-
forcement officials have responded by aggressively pursuing a 
number of highly publicized prosecutions against corporate 
leaders and others accused of violating  financial rules.'' 
These responses make clear that the governance of corpo­
rations has become a central item on the public policy agenda. 
The recent scandals themselves demonstrate that lax regula­
tory institutions, standards, and enforcement can have huge 
implications for the economy and for the public.h Of course, 
go';ernrnent responses to scandals should be well considered 
and etTective. Regulatory reforms that over-react or that ad­
dress symptoms while ignoring underlying causes can be costly 
and counterproductive. The task of government is to restore 
corporate i ntegrity and market confidence without stifling the 
dynamism that underlies a strong economy. 
To address this challenge, the Center for Business and 
Government and its Regulatory Policy Program organized a 
conference in May 2004 to explore the role of government in 
corporate governance. The conference brought together gov­
ernment officials, business leaders, and academic researchers 
INC FRO:VI THE ADOPTION OF PCAOB AuDITING ST\l"D.-\RD No. 2, (2004), avail­
able at http:/ /ww\v.pcaobus.org/Rules_of_the_Board/Documents/Brief­
ingPaper-0040308-2.pdf. 
5. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General 
El l iot  Spitzer, Spitzer Announces Market-Timing Settlement with Bane One 
Advisors Corporation Quly 29, 2004) , available at http://www . 
oag.state .ny.us/press/2004/jun/jun29d_04.html; Press Release, Office of 
New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, Spitzer, S .E.C. Reach Largest 
Mutual Fund Settlement Ever (Mar. 1 5, 2004) ,  available at http:/ /www.oag. 
state.ny.us/press/2004/mar/marl5c_04. html ;  see also SECURITIES & Ex­
CIHNGE CoMMISSION, SEC 2003 ANNU.-\L REPORT, ENFORCEMENT (2003), at 
http:/ /www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ar03enforce.pdf; Press Release, Office 
of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, Secretary Galvin Charges Managers 
of Three Hedge Funds for Targeting U nsophisticated Investors (Aug. 1 3 , 
2003) , available at http:/ /www.sec.state .ma.us/ set/ sctpdf/hedgefundpress 
rei. pdf 
6 .  SPe Lynne L. Dallas, A Prdiminruy Inquily into iltf Responsibility of CmjJo­
rations and their Officers and Direr/on for CmjJomte Climate: the Psychology of En­
ron's De·mise, 35 RUTGERS LJ. 1 ,  1 (2003) (" [T] he reverberating effects of 
En ron's demise undermined confidence in U.S .  stock markets . " ) ;  see also 
Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich, The Enron Efj"ect: Uncertainty, i'vlistrust, 
and Cynicism, ATLA Winter 2003 Convention Reference Materials, Advocacy 
Track: Communicating with the Jury-Repackaging Your Message (Feb. 
2003) ( "The wave of corporate meltdowns epitomized by the En ron scandal 
has had the effect of eroding the fai th workers p lace in our country's busi­
ness institutions ."). 
NYU JOURNAL OF L4 WAND BUSINLSS [Vol. 1:�19 
to discuss three fundamental public policy challenges raised by 
recent corporate abuses. 
First, the recent corporate crisis has brought into relief 
the challenge of who should regulate. Currently, the govern­
ment shares regulatory authority and oversight with various 
nongovernmental, self-regulatory institutions. Self-regulation 
has been prominent in the operation of securities markets as 
well as in the oversight of the accounting and legal profes­
sions. Are these existing self-regulatory arrangements suffi­
cient? Should government change its oversight of self-regula­
tory institutions? Or should government assume a greater and 
more direct role in regulating? 
In addition to choosing who will regulate, recent scandals 
have h ighlighted the challenge of deciding how to regulate. 
Most broadly, regulators face a choice between principles and 
rules. Should regulatory standards articulate broad goals and 
purposes; guiding behavior through the adherence to general 
principles? Or should regulations take the form of specific 
rules that tell companies and their lawyers and auditors exactly 
what is acceptable and unacceptable? Rules have their virtues, 
and they have been widely used, but they also may allow corpo­
rate actors to find ways to comply with the letter of the law 
while circumventing its spirit. 
Finally, regulators face the challenges of deciding how to 
enforce the rules or principles they have adopted. Is more ag­
gressive enforcement needed? Should enforcement officials 
target just individual perpetrators, or should they also go after 
the corporations in which they work? When should regulators 
pursue criminal (as opposed to civil) sanctions? Furthermore, 
since both the state and federal governments have jurisdiction 
over publicly traded corporations, enforcement officials must 
constructively deal with jurisdictional competition. 
These three major policy challenges framed the delibera­
tions at the conference held at the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government. This article summarizes that discussion and is 
organized in three parts: (l) government regulation versus 
self-regulation, (2) the design of regulatory standards, and (3) 
regulatory enforcement. 
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I. 
SELF-REGUI.AT!ON 
For the past century, self-regulatory institutions have 
played a central role in policing both corporate behavior and 
the behavior of the professionals involved in corporate trans­
actions. Since the 1930s, the nation's securities laws have ex­
pressly authorized self-regulatory organizations, such as the 
NYSE or the NASD, to assume primary responsibility for 
rulemaking and enforcement of securities violations.' In addi­
tion, the actions of corporate accountants, corporate lawyers, 
and financial advisors have been subject to oversight by self­
regulatory bodies." 
In light of the recent series of corporate scandals, it is rea­
sonable to ask whether the current structure of self-regulation 
is adequate. However, deciding who should regulate corpo­
rate behavior and securities transactions is not merely a choice 
between either government or self-regulationY Rather, it is a 
question of when and how self-regulation should be used. 
What are the conditions under which self-regulation is appro-
7. Po lly Nyquist, Failure to Engage: The Regulation of Proj:rrieta1y Trading 
Systnns, l?> Y-\LE L. & PoL'v REv. 281, 290-292 (1995); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 6(b)(l), 15 U .S.C.A. § 78f (noting that for national securities 
exchanges, "the rules of the exchange [must be] designed to prevent fraudu­
lent and manipulative acts and practices."); Securities Exchange Act of 1 934 
§ 1 5A(b) ( 1 ), 1 5  U.S .C.A. § 78o-3 (addressing registration and self-regulation 
of national securities associations). 
8 .  Some financial advisors have been subject to oversight by NASD or 
the exchanges. See, e.g., Press Release, NASD Regulation, Inc . ,  NASD 
Charges H&R Block Financial Advisors With Fraud in Sale of Enron Bonds 
to Hundreds of Customers ( Nov. 8 ,  2004), available at h ttp:/ /www .nasd. 
com/ stellent/iclcplg?IdcService=SS_GET _PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW _0 12 
056&ssSourceNodeid=553; Richard Spinale, Exchange Hearing Panel Deci­
sion 04-160 (New York Stock Exchange Oct. 5, 2004), available at http:/ I 
www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-160.pdf; In the Matter of Lawrence Berman, Ameri­
can Stock Exchange (Nov. 2004), available at h ttp:/ /w w.amex.com/at 
am ex/ regulation/ discipline/2004/Berman_Decision_ll 0204.pdf. Lawyers 
and accountants have their own self-regulatory overseers. 
9. For a discussion of different allocations of regulatory authority, see 
Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in F'inancial 
Regulation, 2 THEOR. INQUIRIES IN LAw 4 (200 1), available at http :/ /www. law. 
harvard .edu/ facult:y /hjackson/ pdfs/200 1 Jackson. Cen tralization .Theoretic 
al .lnquiries.pclf; Securities & Exchange Commission, Concept Release Con­
cerning SelfRegulation, Release No. 34-50700 (Nov. 18, 2004), available al 
http:/ I sec .gov I rules/ concept/34-50700.htm. 
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priate? And when it is appropriate, how should self-regulation 
be structured to maximize its advantages and minimize its dis­
advantages? 
The "-idvantages and Disadvantages of Self-Regulation 
To some, the term self-regulation is an oxymoron, or some­
thing akin to the fox guarding the chicken. But self-regulation 
offers a number of potential advantages in the realm of corpo­
rate regulation. Conference participants highlighted at least 
five potential advantages of self-regulation: 
1. Proximity. Self-regulatory organizations are, by defini­
tion, closer to the industry being regulated. This close prox­
imity means that self-regulatory organizations will generally 
have more detailed and current information about the indus­
try, something that is especially helpful in rapidly changing 
sectors. By comparison, government regulators are often play­
ing "catch up." Being closer to the action, self-regulators are 
better situated to identify potential problems more quickly. 
2. Flexibility. Self-regulatory organizations can act with 
greater flexibility than government regulators. They are not 
subject to the same kinds of procedural and due process hur­
dles that government is, nor do they face the same political 
constraints. Governmental regulators do not relish dealing 
with politically unpopular or extremely complex issues, so 
these issues can be delegated to self-regulatory bodies. 
3. ComjJliance. Self-regulation may generate a higher level 
of compliance. The greater the involvement of industry in set­
ting the rules, the more those rules may appear reasonable to 
individual firms. Self-regulation may also generate rules that 
solve the regulatory problem in ways more sensitive to industry 
practices and constraints, and hence it may be easier for firms 
to comply with them. 
4. Collective Interests of Industry. Self-regulation can harness 
the collective interests of the industry. This may be another 
\Nay that self-regulation promotes compliance, as competitors 
can effectively "police" each other. 
5. Resources. Self-regulatory bodies may have a better abil­
ity to secure needed resources. In addition, when regulatory 
funding is self-directed, the legislature cannot cut it off or use 
it as a leverage point over the self-regulatory body. 
�004] THl:' ROLE OF GOVr,'RNfv[}_N'f' IN C:OF<PORXI'E GOVERNANCl� 225 
Although self-regulation has these important advantages, 
it also has some noteworthy drawbacks. Self-regulation pos­
sesses at least five potential disadvantages: 
1 _ Conflicts of Interest. The very proximity that can help the 
self-regulator acquire useful information can be a disadvan­
tage because of conflicts of interest. Knowing an industry bet­
ter does not mean that a regulator will have the proper incen­
tives to regulate it more effectively. There is also the possibility 
that self-regulation will be used by older, more established en­
tities simply to keep out newer market entrants. 
2. Inadequate Sanctions. The greater flexibility afforded 
self�regulatory organizations also means they may have the dis­
cretion to mete out only modest sanctions against even serious 
violators. Conference participants noted several instances of 
self�regulatory organizations imposing small sanctions for 
egregious malfeasance. 
3. Underenforcement. Self-regulators' conflicts of interest 
and flexibility may also make it more likely that compliance 
with rules will be insufficiently monitored. If industry's inter­
ests are at variance with society's interests, then enforcement 
with self-regulation might be less than optimal for the overall 
good of society. 
4. Global Competition. In a global marketplace, an indus­
try's collective interest can be defined by competition with for­
eign markets. If foreign markets are not equally burdened 
with regulation, then aggressive self-regulation could put do­
mestic firms at a serious disadvantage, providing yet another 
reason to question whether self-regulators will make socially 
optimal decisions. 
5. Insuf icient Resources. Although the funding of self-regu­
latory bodies may not be susceptible to the whims of legisla­
tures, underlying conflicts of interest could leave self-regula­
tory bodies with less than sufficient funding. 
Clearly, self-regulation has both advantages and disadvan­
tages. It is neither an inherently good nor inherently bad way 
to regulate corporate conduct. The challenge, then, is to find 
the situations in which self-regulation is the most appropriate 
model. After that, the challenge becomes finding optimal 
\Nays of designing self-regulatory institutions. 
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Designing SelfRegulatory Institutions 
Even if existing self-regulatory institutions receive some of 
the blame for recent scandals, it does not follow that self-regu­
lation should be abandoned entirely. Instead, the solution 
may be to change the internal governance structures of self­
regulatory institutions, grant them new powers or increase 
their resources, or modify the degree and type of government 
oversight they receive. 
Self-regulatory organizations can be designed in different 
ways.10 Some self-regulatory bodies are stronger and more ef­
fective than others. At the weakest end of the spectrum lies a 
voluntary industry code of conduct for which compliance is 
voluntary and the industry has little or no enforcement capa­
bility. For example, the Association of Investment Manage­
ment and Research (now known as the CFA Institute) simply 
has the power to revoke the ability of its members to refer to 
themselves as "chartered financial analysts."11 At the other 
end of the spectrum lie self-regulatory bodies with greater 
powers both to make and to enforce binding rules. The tradi­
tional securities self-regulatory organizations, such as NYSE 
and NASD, develop extensive sets of rules and can bar those 
who violate these rules altogether from participating in the se­
curities markets.12 In between these poles lie organizations 
such as state bar associations that possess little regulatory au­
thority but have the power to disbar or exclude, as well as self­
regulatory bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board ("FASB") that have the power to adopt rules but rela­
tively little ability to enforce them. '"' 
In addition, some self-regulatory bodies are more closely 
connected with the industry's self-interest than others. Institu­
tions that share responsibilities for both creating markets and 
regulating them will face an inherent conflict-whether real 
l 0 .  Margo Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Fivl' ModeL� of Seif-Regula­
tiou, 29 Orr.·\WA L. R£\". 233 (1997) .  
11. See Bylaws of the CFA Institute § 3 .10 (a) (1)  (2004) , available at 
http:/ /www.cfainstitute .org/ memservices/ pdf/ cfainsti tutearticlesandbylaws 
2004finalversion2. pdf. 
12. NASD Manual Rule 8310, available at http:/ /cchwallstreet .com/ 
nasd/ nasdviewer.asp?SelectedNode=2&FileName=/ nascl/ nasd_rules/ Rules 
oftheAssociation_mg.xml#chp_1_2; NYSE Rule 476. 
13. See generally Financial Accounting Standards Board Information ,  at 
http:/ /www.fasb.org. 
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or perceived-that is absent from institutions that keep regula­
tory functions separate from market operations. The NASD 
and, more recently, the NYSE have taken steps to make their 
regulatory functions independent of their market operations, 
precisely to keep the regulatory side of their organizations less 
conflicted. 1 ·• 
Finally, self-regulatory organizations can vary in terms of 
the amount of government oversight they receive. Some self­
regulatory institutions are entirely separate from the govern­
ment, while others, such as the NYSE and NASD, are overseen 
by the SEC.1''' Government oversight can help overcome some 
of the limitations of self-regulation, counteracting potential 
bias while still securing the advantages of self-regulation. Gov­
ernment officials need not know as much as the self-regulators 
do about the industry, since they are not the principal regula­
tors; they simply need to be able to assess the quality and seri­
ousness of a self-regulatory organization's rulemaking and en­
forcement behavior. Moreover, by effectively delegating au­
thority to sdf-regulatory institutions for routine regulatory 
functions, government agencies can then utilize their re­
sources for detecting and responding to major rule violations 
and monitoring for systemic problems. 
Loohing Ahead 
Despite the oiticism self-regulatory institutions have re­
ceived in recent years, self-regulation seems here to stay. But 
self-regulation is changing. Institutions such as the NYSE are 
undergoing significant structural changes, and the self-regula­
tory approach to overseeing the accounting industry is being 
revamped. An important task for the government in the fu­
ture will be to monitor how well these changes work. 
II. 
RULES VERSUS PRINCIPLES 
Whether the regulatory body is governmental or self-regu­
latory, it must decide whether to adopt principles or rules. In 
14. National Association of Securities Dealers, Report of the NASD Select 
Committee on Stn1clure and Governance to the NASD Board of Governors ( 1995 );  
William Power, NASD Board Approves Restmcturing of Association and iVasdaq 
Stock Market, WALL ST. J . ,  Nov. 20,  1995 ,  at B2. 
15.  See aLm supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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response to recent corporate scandals, many have suggested 
that the current U.S. regulatory system is too focused on 
rules.11' Although rules can be simple, they also can provide 
an easy target for manipulation. Some observers, including the 
SEC, advocate a more principles-based approach to regulation 
that stresses goals and objectives rather than the particular 
methods of achieving those ends. 17 
Current policy responses to the recent corporate scandals 
exhibit a tension between rules and principles. The most no­
table legislative change has been the passage of the Sarbanes­
Oxley Act, which has imposed numerous new and detailed 
rules on corporations.18 At the same time, the primary ac­
counting standard setter, FASB, has been criticized for relying 
too much on detailed rules to determine the appropriate ac­
counting treatment and, as a result, has recently explored a 
more conceptual or principles-guided approach to accounting 
standards.19 
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Rules 
In the United States, regulators and industry players often 
seek refuge in rules. Indeed, industry participants often lobby 
for a rules-based environment to avoid the unpredictability of 
later enforcement. Rules are typically thought to be simpler 
and easier to follow than principles, demarcating a clear line 
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Rules also re­
duce discretion on the part of individual managers or audi­
tors, making it less likely that their judgments will be moti­
vated by a desire to achieve personal gain at the expense of 
investors or the public. The seminal work in this area is the 
1 6. Matthew A. Melone, United States Accounting Standards-Rules or Princi­
ples?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 1 6 1 ,  1 1 6 1 -62 (2004) ( noting that i n  the wake of 
recent corporate scandals numerous arguments have been advanced in favor 
of a shift to principles-based accounting standards) . 
1 7 . Securities & Exchange Commission, Study Pursuant to Section 
1 08(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the Uni ted 
States Finan cial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Account ing System 
(2003) ,  available at h ttp :/ /www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbased­
stand. htm (staff report recommending a more principles-based approach to 
accounting standards) . 
18. See sujnil note 2. 
1 9. FASB, Proposal: Principles-Based Approach to U .S. Standard Setting  
(Oct. 21. 2002), available at h ttp :/ /www.fasb.org/proposals/princ iples­
based_approach. pelf. 
book Pla_ving by the Rules, by Frederick Schauer of the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, which analyzes the nature of 
rules-based decision making. �o 
Despite the virtues of rules, in practice rules can be more 
complex-and, hence, more murky-than principles. As 
lawmakers try to address every conceivable eventuality, the 
rulebook becomes harder to understand and harder to follow. 
The tax code, for example, is heavily rules-based, and 
problems often arise when corporations undertake new types 
of transactions not covered by the code.�1 Determining the 
appropriate tax treatment can sometimes be quite difficult, 
leaving auditors with de facto discretion and creating the need 
for additional rules to clarifY inconsistencies or close gaps. 
Moreover, even simple and clear rules can be manipulated. 
An effective planner can use the exact wording of the rule to 
structure transactions in ways that comply with the letter of the 
law but circumvent its underlying purpose.n 
Recent Innovations in Regulatory Design 
Since rules and principles each have their strengths and 
weaknesses, regulators sometimes try to combine them both in 
hybrid systems of regulation. Examples include recently 
adopted international standards governing the computation of 
risk-adjusted bank capital and the SEC's standards on calculat­
ing the fair value of mutual funds.�" Both sets of regulations 
rely on principles that the industry must follow in developing 
and deploying complex econometric models to assess their 
own compliance. 
20. fREDERICK SC:Hc\UER, PLW!C.:C BY Tl IE RLILf.S : A PI- I I l.OSOPI-IICAI. [X.'\i\11-
NATION oF RuLE-BAsED DECJSION-J\IL-\hJNG IN L\w . .;.No IN  LIFE ( 1991). 
21. See generally Noel B. Cunningham and James R. Repetti, Texturdism 
and Tax Shelters, 24 V.".. T,\X REv . 1 ( 20()4) .  
22 .  Sre, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,  Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 995 
( 1995) ("Because rules have clear edges, they allow people to 'evade' them 
by engaging in conduct that is technically exempted but that creates the 
same or analogous harms.") . 
23. BAsEL CoMMITTEE, BASEL II: lNTERN.·HJON.:..L CoNVERGENCE oF CAPITAL 
MEASURHIENT AND C:.._PIT.-\L STAi'iD,\Ros: A RE\·IsEo FRAMEvVORK Uune 2004), 
available at http:/ /w w.bis.org/publ/bcbs I 07.htm [hereinafter BASEL] ; SEC 
Division of Investment  Management, April 2001 Letter to the ICI Regarding 
Valuation Issues, available at http:/ /www .sec.gov I divisions/investment/ gui 
clance/tyle043001 .htm . 
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The international banking community is facing the imple­
mentation of a new capital adequacy framework, known as Ba­
sel II.24 Although the underlying document is lengthy and 
complicated, the framework is based on risk-management 
principles and relies heavily on the parties with access to the 
best information. In this case, the regulated financial institu­
tions are deemed to have the best information. Accordingly, 
Basel II recognizes that banks are responsible for computing 
their own bank capital and for determining the appropriate 
level of bank capital (within certain specified limits) . 20 The 
role of the regulator is then to supervise the private parties 
after the fact. It is yet to be seen how well this innovative ap­
proach will work. The success of Basel II will probably rest on 
the ability of regulators to assess the sophisticated econometric 
models that banks develop and, hence, the willingness of 
member governments to invest in hiring and educating capa­
ble regulators. 
In the case of the SEC's mutual fund standards, the issue 
is how to value fund shares each day.2n The appropriate valua­
tion of shares is not clear-cut, as some mutual fund holdings 
are illiquid while others may change in value in domestic after­
hours trading or trading on markets around the world occur­
ring after the 4:00 p.m. market close in the United States. The 
SEC's fair value standard is principles-based in that it stipulates 
that a mutual fund has an obligation to determine the "fair" 
value of the shares.27 As with the banking example, the regula­
tion relies upon the party with access to the best information 
to determine the appropriate value. Historically, most mutual 
funds have chosen to use the close of business prices to deter­
mine the fair value of the shares, although a few firms rely on a 
separate pricing model to value shares when there has been a 
substantial move in prices since the close of business.28 As 
24. See generally BASEL, sujmL note 23. 
25. ld. at 1 4, 1 50,  1 8 1 ,  1 83 ,  1 95 .  
26 .  See, e.g., Statement of Paul F. Roye to  Open Meeting of SEC ( Dec.  3, 
2003) , available at http:/  /www .sec.gov /news/ speech/ spc h 1 20303pfr.htm. 
27.  See SEC Staff Letter to Investment Company I nstitute ( Dec .  30, 200 1 ) ,  
available at http:/ /www.sec.gov I divisions/investment/ guidance/tyle04300 1 .  
h tm ;  see also I nvestmen t  Company Act o f  1 940 ,  1 5  U . S . C .  
§ 80 (a) (2 ) (a) (4l ) (B) . 
28. For background on the mutual fund industry, see RoBERT C. PozEN, 
THE MuTUAL FuND BusiNESS ( 2d ed. 2002 ) . 
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with the new Basel II standards, it  remains to be seen how well 
this approach will work. 
The Case of Financial Accounting 
Another area undergoing regulatory re-design is corpo­
rate financial accounting. The requirements for corporate fi­
nancial accounting were initially established after the stock 
market crash in 1 929.29 At that time, corporate financial state­
ments were not always audited, and accounting followed in­
dustry practice rather than authoritative rules.30 The poor 
quality of financial reporting was thought to be a signiflcant 
factor leading to the stock market run-up and collapse. " '  In 
response, Congress passed legislation that required the ac­
counting industry to disclose regular flnancial statements that 
have been audited by external parties.32 
Outside investors require financial and accounting infor­
mation that is both reliable and has been verified by auditors 
who are independent of management. Traditionally, account­
ing and auditing practices in the United States have been gov­
erned by detailed rules.33 However, as recent scandals have 
shown, transactions can be structured to circumvent the rules. 
Enron's extensive use of special purpose entities, for example, 
enabled the company to avoid reporting consolidated infor­
mation about high levels of debt. 34 
In the wake of these scandals, some observers have pro­
posed an alternative, hybrid approach to flnancial accounting 
standards, one that asserts an overarching principle that rele­
vant and useful information should be reported.3"' A move to 
29. Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It is To-­
day: Part I, 1 7  AccouNTING HoRIZONS 1 89 ,  1 89-205 (Sept. 2003) .  
30. George 0 .  May, Corporate Publicity and the Auditor, 42 jouRNAL OF Ac­
couNTANCY 321,  321 -26 (Nov. 1 926). 
3 1 .  Ross L. 'vVATrs AND jEROLD L. Znvtl\tERMAN, PoSITIVE AccouNTINc THE­
ORY (1 986) . 
32. See generally Securities Act of 1 933, 1 5  U.S.C.  § 77; Securities Ex­
change Act of 1 934, 1 5  U.S.C.  § 77a et. seq. 
33. See Melone,  supra note 1 6, at 1 1 62. 
34. Edmund L. Jenkins, The FASB 's Role in Serving the Public: A Response to 
the Emon CollajJSe (Mar. 1 4, 2002 ) ,  available at h ttp:/ /www.fasb.org/news/ 
fasb_role.pdf 
35. See Katherine Schipper, PrincijJles-Based Accounting Standards, 1 7  Ac. 
couNTING HoRIZONS 6 1 (Mar. 2003) ; AAA Financial Accounting Standards 
Committee, Evaluating ConcejJls-Based vs. Rules-Based Approaches to Standard 
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a more principles-based system of accounting standards, how­
ever, will face several important challenges. 
First, many accountants are not sufficiently trained to 
make the requisite business-based judgment calls. Hence, 
under a principles-based system , many accountants could need 
to undergo significant training to acquire new skills. Second, 
corporate executives are encouraged, principally through 
compensation arrangements, to maximize shareholder value 
in the ncar term. For principles-based s tandards to be effec­
tive, the economic incentives that can lead managers to dis­
close unreliable or biased information would still need to be 
addressed. A restructuring of executive compensation con­
tracts may be needed."·6 Third, in the absence of clear rules, 
company accountants may need to exercise a higher degree of 
professional resolve when results they are charged with 
presenting accurately conflict with corporate executives' inter­
ests. '" Outside auditors may similarly need to show greater re­
solve when faced with client statements that are inconsistent 
with broad accounting principlcs.">H Showing such resolve may 
be particularly challenging, since audi tors and accountants 
may be less able to predict how regulators or courts will apply 
these principles in particular contexts."'') 
Setting, 1 7  AccouNTING HoRIZONS 73 (Mar. 2003 ) ;  Mark W. Nelson ,  Behav­
io-ral Evidence on the Ejfects of Ptincip!.es- and Rules-Based Standards, 1 7  AccouNT­
ING H oRIZONS 9 1  ( Mar. 2003) . 
36. For a lucid analysis of executive compensation more generally, see 
LUCIAN BEBC:I !UK & jESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORI'v!ANC :E: THE UNFUL­
FILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) . 
37. On the general pressures f�lCing company accountants, see Will iam E .  
Shafer, Ethical PtPssure, Otganizational-Pmfessional Conflict, and Related Wmk 
Outcomes Among l\!Ianagement Accountants, 38 J .  Bus. ETH ICS 263 ( 2002 ) .  
38. See Scott A .  Taub, Speech Before the 2003 Thirty-Firs t  AICPA Na­
tional Conference on Current  SEC Developments (Dec.  1 1 , 2003) (sug­
gesting that "auditors need to get more comfortable tel l ing cl ients that cer­
tain accounting treatmen ts are unacceptable ,  even in the absence of l i tera­
ture that specifically says so" ) .  
39. O f  course, the status quo i s  not always a n  easy one for the audi tor i n  
the face o f  a n  aggressive management. As Roman \Neil has noted, i n  a rules­
based system, management can always challenge the auditor by demanding, 
"Show me where it says I can ' t . "  Roman Wei!, Fundamental Causes of the 
Accounting Debacle at Enron:  Show Me Where It  Says I Can 't ,  Summary of 
Testimony Presented to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
(Feb. 6, 2002 ) ,  available at  http:/ /w;vw.sec .gov/rules/proposecl/s74002/ 
rlweil l .h tm 
In the end, notwithstanding the problems with rules­
based accounting, businesses, auditors, and regulators may 
well continue to welcome rules. vVith the business environ­
ment in the United States seeming ever more litigious, corpo­
rate leaders may resist movement toward principles and con­
tin ue to favor rules as a way of reducing uncertainty and avoid­
ing costly litigation. 
Looking Ahead 
Just as the proper balance between government regula­
tion and self-regulation is l ikely to vary by situation, so too no 
single spot on the continuum between principles and rules is 
l ikely to apply in all circumstances. Both ends of the spectrum 
have their strengths and weaknesses. Finding the point in the 
range that is appropriate for a given particular issue will re­
main a persistent challenge. A move to a more principles­
based approach to accounting in the United States will  prove 
especially challenging in the absence of greater political sup­
port. 
III. 
ENFORCEMENT 
Enforcement connects in important ways to both of the 
issues we have discussed. ·whether the regulator is a govern­
ment agency or a self-regulatory organization, its rules or prin­
ciples must be enforced. As Voltaire argued, "It is well to kill  
from time to time an admiral to encourage the others."40 In 
this same vein ,  recent prosecutions have had l ife-altering ef­
fects on both individuals and organizations. Jamie Olis of 
Dynegy, for example, was sentenced to twenty-four years i n  
prison for accounting fraud.4 1  Arthur Andersen LLP was ef­
fectively put out of business after being convicted of obstruc­
tion of justice.42 
40. Voltaire, Candide, in CANDIDE,  Z;\DIC AND SELECTED STORIES 78-79 
(Donald Frame, trans. 1 961 ) .  
4 1 .  Simon Romero, Ex-Executive Of Dpwgy Is Sentenced To 24 Years, N.Y. 
TI�IES, Mar. 26, 2004, at C2. 
42. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Arulersen �5 Fall from Grace, 8 1  WASI-L 
U .  L. Q. 9 1 7  (2003 ) ;  see alsoJennifer M. Niece & Gregory M. Trompeter, The 
Demise of Arthur Andersen 's One-Firm Concept: A Case-Study in CorjJorale Govern­
ance, 1 09 Bus. & Soc'v RE\· . 1 83 (2004) . 
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Enforcement not only has m<�or consequences for indi­
vidual and corporate violators, but it also can affect the overall 
credibility of a regulatory system. Enforcement actions send a 
message to the broader public. They both deter bad actors 
and level the competitive playing field. That said, greater en­
forcement is not always better, for taken too far it can dampen 
socially valuable risk-taking. A.s with any important policy tool, 
regulators need to know when and how to pursue enforce­
ment actions, especially criminal prosecutions. 
The Role and Limits of Criminal Sanctions 
When employees' life-long pensions disappear in the 
wake of corporate fraud, white-collar crimes can no longer be 
seen as truly victimless. For the purpose of enforcement, then, 
one important issue is whether victims of white-collar crime 
are harmed more or less than victims of street crime. Some 
argue that employees who lose their jobs or retirement savings 
deserve to see the government give more than a mere wrist 
slapping to executives who caused their losses.43 Others would 
question the fairness of a system that imposes a twenty-four­
year sentence on someone convicted of accounting fraud 
when defendants convicted of criminal homicide often spend 
less time than that in jail. 44 
Whether fair or not, criminal sanctions certainly can be 
effective in deterring corporate misconduct. Corporations, as 
profit-making enterprises, are accustomed to balancing risk 
and reward. The threat of a civil penalty may not be adequate 
to deter misbehavior if corporate officials simply view potential 
fines as "a cost of doing business." On the other hand, more 
severe sanctions, such as imprisonment or being put out of 
business, materially change the calculus. The possibility of go­
ing to jail does tend to catch the attention of corporate offi­
cials, and is often (though not always) enough to derail fur­
ther contemplation of illegal conduct. Criminal law also em-
43.  See, e.g., Damien Cave, Lock Up the Analysts and Throw A.way the Key, 
SALON ( May 1 7, 2002 ) ,  available at h ttp:/ />v.vw.salon.com/tech/feature/ 
2002/ OS /20 I analysts . 
44. Kathryn Keneally, Some of the Distortions to jmtice Caused by the Sentenc­
ing Guidelines, CHAMPION MAGAZINE ( Nat'! A.ss 'n  of Criminal Defe nse Law­
yers) (Aug. 2004) , available at h ttp:/ hvww.nacdl .org/public. nsf/0/ 4a779f54 
d2fbe l ce85256f1 7006bc605?0penDocument. 
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powers other law-abiding individuals - whether the board of 
directors, senior management, or other professionals - to 
stand up to less well intentioned colleagues or, at a minimum, 
to resist going along with misconduct. 
Yet criminal law is no panacea. First, many of the agen­
cies that regulate business conduct lack the authority to im­
pose criminal sanctions. For example, even though the SEC, 
the PCAOB, and the Office of the Secretarv of the Common-
/ 
wealth of Massachusetts play key roles in overseeing important 
corporate activities, none are authorized to seek or impose 
criminal sanctions. Second, criminal sanctions such as fines 
and imprisonment cannot provide restitution to shareholders, 
employees, vendors, or others injured by corporate miscon­
duct. Third, not everyone will be deterred by the threat of 
criminal prosecution, as some people are prepared to accept a 
short prison sentence rather than pay back personal or corpo­
rate profits. Finally, criminal sanctions may raise the stakes so 
high that they unintentionally chill legitimate and economi­
cally beneficial conduct. For these reasons, effective enforce­
ment is likely to depend on the continued use of civil penalties 
combined with the selective use of criminal sanctions. 
The Organization as Defendant 
Many of the strategic decisions facing prosecutorial and 
civil enforcement staff will be the same whether sanctions are 
criminal or civil. One of these decisions involves against whom 
to file an enforcement action .  Enforcement officials can pur­
sue just the individuals who actually engaged in the underlying 
offense, they can name managers or the board of directors for 
failing to supervise properly, or they can even go after the cor­
poration itself. 
One conference participant noted that major scandals fos­
ter a "lynch-mob mentality" that drives both the public and 
enforcement officials to want to pursue the people at the top, 
regardless of whether they have clone something warranting 
punishment.45 Prosecutorial discretion,  however, ultimately 
requires a reasonable balancing of both individual fairness 
and public policy considerations. Charging the corporation, 
45. In order to faci l i tate open dialogue, the workshop discussion was 
conducted on a not-for-attribution basis, so statements are not identified in  
this article with the name of  any specific participant. 
NYC JOUFV.V.-\ 10 OF LA W :1.ND flUSINFSS [ Vo l .  l : :! l l) 
for example, may do much to deter others in an industt;, but 
it mav also negatively affect manv people bevond those who 
J ....._., J j / 
violated the law. This concern is especially palpable in the 
case of a criminal indictment, as shown by the demise of Ar­
thur Andersen; however, it is also relevant in civil cases since 
large punitive fines may put a company on the brink of finan­
cial ruin. 
In deciding whether to charge the corporate entity, en­
forcement officials should consider the nature of the underly­
ing conduct in relation to the overall operations of the busi­
ness. It is easier to justify criminal or civil sanctions against the 
organization when the organization-and not merely the bad 
employee-benefits from the misconduct. For example, an 
antitrust violation by which a company increases its profits is a 
better candidate for an organizational prosecution than a case 
of embezzlement by an employee that benefits the employee 
only (and in which the company is itself a victim) . 
Another factor to consider is whether a corporation has 
systemically failed to supervise its officers and employees. 
Companies' boards and senior management are responsible 
for the overall culture of the organization. They must put in 
place procedures, training, and monitoring that are reasona­
bly designed to prevent and detect violations of regulations. 
Recent legislative developments require that public companies 
implement such stPps, including ( 1 )  a code of ethics,4(' (2) cer­
tification of financial information by the chief executive of­
ficer and chief financial officer,n and (3) procedures that em­
power and protect employees who may wish to report miscon­
duct.4R Isolated misconduct that occurs despite these 
safeguards, and of which management was actually unaware, 
generally would not give rise to proceedings against the com­
pany, or even against senior management. 
Federal versus State Law Enforcement 
Corporate actors face the threat of enforcement by multi­
ple regulators. When the SEC was created in 1 934, states al­
ready had jurisdiction over securities matters and they con-
46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, sufna note 2, § 406. 
47. !d. § 404. 
48. !d. § 11 07. 
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tinue to retain much authority:'9 State and federal prosecu­
tors also co-exist with self-regulators such as the NYSE and the 
NASD. The existence of multiple regulators has often been 
justified in part on the premise that competition among en­
forcement agencies results in optimal deterrence. '0 
The deterrent value of multiple enforcers depends, how­
ever, in part on regulations being clear and consistent across 
jurisdictions. Variations across jurisdictions only give compa­
nies opportunities to exploit the differences. Moreover, if the 
existence of multiple enforcers creates a patchwork of incon­
sistent, sometimes even incompatible, legal rulings, this can be 
counterproductive for businesses engaged in interstate or in­
ternational commerce. 
Even vvhen rules are clear and universally accepted, the 
presence of multiple enforcement authorities can create 
problems. Political factors may motivate enforcement agen­
cies to insist on being "at the table" in dealing with a major 
crisis. Or different agencies may compete against each other 
to see which can impose the toughest sanctions. Competition 
motivated by a desire to score political points can hinder the 
overall objective of enforcement, either by overly complicating 
resolution of enforcement actions or by misallocating scarce 
resources so that other important regulatory problems go ne­
glected. 
Finally, it may be difficult to maintain the proper balance 
between enforcement at the federal, state, and self-regulatory 
levels when one regulator is perceived-rightly or wrongly-as 
lax or ineffective. Others will rush in to fill the perceived vac­
uum. For example, the recent mutual fund la-wsuits filed by 
New York, Massachusetts, and other states against broker-deal­
ers and investment advisers took aim at conduct that tradition-
49. JoEL SEL.ICi\IAN, THE TRANSFORMATION oF \•VALL STREET: A HISTORY oF 
THE SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE CoMMISSION .-\ND MoDERN CoRPOR-·\TE Fr. 
NANCE 42-50 ( 1 995) .  
50. See Roberta S. Kannel,  AjJjJrojJriateness of Regulation at the Federal or Stall' 
Ler,el: Reconciling federal and State Interests in Securities RPgulation in the United 
States and !:�urope, 28 BROOKuN J . INT'L L. 495 (2003) ( noting that " [s] ome 
scholars believe that competition  among financial regulators is beneficial 
and results in  an optimum level of regulatory in trusion upon ptivate busi­
ness in terests") . 
'238 NHI JOURNi\L OF lA W AND J US!NF.SS [Vol 1 : '2 l 9 
ally fell within the SEC's province."'1 Those who believe the 
SEC was insufficiently interested in pursuing leads about im­
proper conduct in the mutual funds industry may well con­
clude that the state litigation shows the value of enforcement 
competition. Yet, taken too far, it is also possible that such 
competition will waste resources and generate inconsistent rul­
ings across jurisdictions. "'� 
Looking Ahead 
The existence of multiple enforcers, each facing choices 
about whether to pursue criminal or civil penalties against ei­
ther individuals or organizations, makes regulatory enforce­
ment a complicated enterprise. Competition among enforce­
ment jurisdictions certainly can increase deterrence. How­
ever, in the future, continued efforts at coordination among 
enforcement officials are likely to be needed to allocate lim­
ited enforcement resources sensibly and to ensure fairness and 
consistency in the overall regulatory system. 
IV. 
CoNcr .usroN 
The cns1s of confidence in America's capital markets, 
sparked by the corporate scandals of the past several years, has 
generated widespread debate over proposals for regulatory 
changes. Underlying these discussions are fundamental policy 
issues about the role of government in corporate governance. 
Although these policy issues are sometimes framed as simple 
dichotomies-for example, government regulation versus self­
regulation, principles versus rules, or criminal versus civil pen­
alties-the choices government faces are in fact neither simple 
nor dichotomous. 
V\That, then, is the role of government in corporate gov­
ernance? It is undoubtedly not any single role, but different 
roles-that of policymaker, enforcer, and overseer-in differ­
ent situations. Accordingly, there is still another fundamental 
5 1 .  Will iam H. Donaldson, SEC Chai rman , Speech at NASAA Confer­
ence (Sept. 1 4, 2003) , available at http:/ /www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch09 
l 403whd.h tm.  
52.  For a concise analysis of federal-state coordination ,  see  John C. Cof­
fee,  Competitive Federalism: 171.e Rise of the State Attome:y General, 230 N Y LJ 5 
(Sept. 1 8, 2003) . 
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role for government to undertake: the role of analyst, seeking 
to identify the conditions under which to deploy different con­
figurations of regulatory institutions, standards , and enforce­
ment practices. Given the range of policy issues raised by cor­
porate governance, and the variety of industries and firms in­
volved, government decision makers will need to understand 
thoroughly the effects that different regulatory actions can 
have in terms of a range of policy criteria. 
On the issue of self-regulation, this means, among other 
things, considering the effectiveness of self-regulatory organi­
zations as policymakers as well as their effectiveness as enforc­
ers. It also calls for careful evaluation of the recent structural 
changes in self-regulatory organizations. What impact will 
these changes have on the credibility and effectiveness of self­
regulation? 
On the issue of regulatory design, decision makers need 
to understand better what makes different degrees of specific­
ity and generality "right" for particular types of regulatory 
problems. They also need to assess whether certain hybrid sys­
tems can overcome some of the limitations of rules or princi­
ples alone. 
Finally, on the issue of enforcement, state and federal offi­
cials should analyze why some individuals and organizations 
adhere responsibly to regulatory standards-and why others 
do not. Such analysis would help enhance government's  abil­
ity pursue optimal enforcement, instead of under- or over-en­
forcement. 
The steps that government has already taken, and will un­
doubtedly continue to take in the wake of the recent scandals, 
will affect both the integrity and productivity of the American 
economy. The success of these efforts will be made more 
likely with careful attention to the kinds of issues summarized 
in this article, and with further constructive discussion among 
the many constituencies affected by the multiple roles that 
government plays in corporate governance. 
